GAMES, MARKETS AND INFORMATION - 2018/9
Module code: ECO3011
This module develops equilibrium concepts for static, dynamic, complete and incomplete information. These are applied to various aspects of economic importance: markets, bargaining, job-market signalling, expert advice and electoral competition.
GERSHKOV A Prof (Economics)
Number of Credits: 15
ECTS Credits: 7.5
Framework: FHEQ Level 6
JACs code: L100
Module cap (Maximum number of students): N/A
Prerequisites / Co-requisites
Economics and Mathematics students: this module cannot be taken with MAT3046 Game Theory with Applications in Biology and Economics.
Indicative content includes:
Elements of a game, types of games and equilibria concepts;
Static games of complete information: the Nash equilibrium;
Dynamic games of complete information: the subgame perfect equilibrium;
Static games of incomplete information: the Bayesian equilibrium;
Dynamic games of incomplete information: the perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Sequential equilibria
|Assessment type||Unit of assessment||Weighting|
|School-timetabled exam/test||CLASS TEST IN WEEK 6 - 90 MINUTES, PROBLEM SOLVING QUESTIONS||30|
|Examination||2 HOUR EXAMINATION - TECHNICAL AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS||70|
The assessment strategy is designed to provide students with the opportunity to demonstrate
clear understanding of the various concepts
transform problems in social science into game forms
conduct equilibrium analysis of a given model
Thus, the summative assessment for this module consists of:
One problem-solving class test. This test will involve 2 questions in 90 minutes and normally takes place in week 6. The test will cover the lecture/tutorial material from all previous weeks. Its principal aim is to give students some early feedback on how they are coping with the material.
A two-hour long final exam. This will consist of two sections. Section A will ask students to answer ONE question from TWO. Section B will ask students to answer ONE question out of TWO. Questions include both technical and discussion aspects.
The mixture between technical analysis and discussion / interpretation ensures that students are able to demonstrate that they have the skills necessary to apply some of the equilibrium/solution concepts rigorously, as well as showing their understanding of the real-world applications of these notions
Formative assessment and feedback
Students receive verbal feedback during both lectures and tutorials. During lectures, smaller practise exercises are solved and discussed, while the problems discussed in tutorials are more substantial. Guideline solutions are posted online after tutorials have taken place. Feedback relating to the coursework test is predominantly given individually and in detail on the scripts of students, and main issues are discussed further in a lecture.
- show how game theory and informational economics can provide valuable insights in a broad variety of problems in economics and the social sciences
|001||Understand how information and dynamic assumptions lead to different equilibrium notions;||KC|
|002||Solve for the following equilibria/solutions: Nash, subgame perfect equilibrium, Bayesian and perfect Bayesian; Sequential equilibrium and some refinements, Core and Shapley Value.||KC|
|003||Apply these concepts to a wide range of problems in economics||KCPT|
C - Cognitive/analytical
K - Subject knowledge
T - Transferable skills
P - Professional/Practical skills
Overall student workload
Independent Study Hours: 123
Lecture Hours: 22
Tutorial Hours: 5
Methods of Teaching / Learning
The learning and teaching strategy is designed to:
Strengthen students’ analytical and cognitive skills
Provide insights into how different environments impact decision problems and their outcomes
Appreciate the tensions that may arise between benefits of different agents
The learning and teaching methods include:
2 hour lectures per week x 11 weeks (22 hours)
1 hour tutorial per week x 5 weeks (5 hours)
123 hours of guided independent study.
Indicated Lecture Hours (which may also include seminars, tutorials, workshops and other contact time) are approximate and may include in-class tests where one or more of these are an assessment on the module. In-class tests are scheduled/organised separately to taught content and will be published on to student personal timetables, where they apply to taken modules, as soon as they are finalised by central administration. This will usually be after the initial publication of the teaching timetable for the relevant semester.
Reading list for GAMES, MARKETS AND INFORMATION : http://aspire.surrey.ac.uk/modules/eco3011
Programmes this module appears in
|Politics and Economics BSc (Hons)||1||Optional||A weighted aggregate mark of 40% is required to pass the module|
|Business Economics BSc (Hons)||1||Optional||A weighted aggregate mark of 40% is required to pass the module|
|Economics BSc (Hons)||1||Optional||A weighted aggregate mark of 40% is required to pass the module|
|Economics and Finance BSc (Hons)||1||Optional||A weighted aggregate mark of 40% is required to pass the module|
|Economics and Mathematics BSc (Hons)||1||Optional||A weighted aggregate mark of 40% is required to pass the module|
|Financial Mathematics BSc (Hons)||1||Optional||A weighted aggregate mark of 40% is required to pass the module|
Please note that the information detailed within this record is accurate at the time of publishing and may be subject to change. This record contains information for the most up to date version of the programme / module for the 2018/9 academic year.